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Alpina
A semi-annual review of mountaineering in the greater ranges

Attacks on Mountaineers in the Greater Himalaya
In spring 2013, two stories of local people in the Himalaya attacking western
mountaineers dominated the conventional media and the blogosphere. Both
events induced ominous predictions of lasting destruction of mountaineering
in the Himalaya and the end of trust between westerners and the indigenous
peoples of Himalayan mountain areas.
The attacks were closely linked in time, and they gave the impression of
general deteriorating civility in the Himalaya. In fact, one incident took place
on Mount Everest and the other on Nanga Parbat, about 960 miles away. The
two locales represent almost the extreme ends of the region. (Nanga Parbat
is the westernmost of the accepted list of 8,000-m peaks and the Everest/
Makalu group contains the easternmost, except for Kangchenjunga about 100
miles further on.) There was little evidence of conflict in between.
The Incident on Everest. The attacks were unlike in severity and cause.
From the news-reading public’s point of view, news from Everest always beats
that from any other Himalayan mountain—everyone knows Everest. What
happened on Everest was actually no more than a squabble, but following the
incident (no stronger word is justified), Nick Paumgarten wrote exhaustively
about it in the June 3, 2013, issue of The New Yorker. On April 27, three
western climbers—the well-known Simone Moro of Italy and Ueli Steck
of Switzerland, accompanied by a lesser-known British cameraman named
Jon Griffith—were trying to climb past a group of Sherpas employed by a
consortium of commercial expedition companies to establish and fix ropes on
the Normal Route up the south side of Everest. This route construction has
been a usual feature of spring on Everest for years, but recent warmer spring
weather has made it (in the view of the Sherpas) a laborious and dangerous
task. They ask climbers not to attempt ascents through the work parties until
the route is completed. What actually happened is told very differently by the
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participants and has been further distorted by sensational news accounts, but
a general outline now seems to be agreed on.
The three westerners were told not to climb through the working Sherpas,
but they had a permit for the route and chose to climb on, saying that they
would not use the already-fixed ropes. As they climbed above the work group
and crossed over the projected line, the climbers and Sherpas exchanged
tense words. Moro admits and apologizes for calling the Sherpa Sirdar a
motherf*****— a term that is even more insulting in Nepali than in English.
The Sirdar immediately called a work action, and the Sherpas walked off the
job. The three westerners, fearing that they might be accused of delaying
the opening of the route, decided to postpone their climb and eventually
descended to Camp 2.
There they learned of threats and rumors of threats by the Sherpas against
them. The next day, an angry crowd of Sherpas, reported as hundreds of
masked men brandishing ice axes and knives and throwing stones, surrounded
the three. Sherpas, who as children draw herding duty and control wayward
animals by well-aimed rocks to their rumps, are very accurate stone-throwers,
and knives and ice axes are indeed threatening. The “knives” turned out to be
one small penknife and no large stones found their mark. The real damage
was to the egos and reputations of all involved: the western climbers; the
commercial operators that pay for the route preparation in the spring and
then dominate spring climbing on Everest; the Nepalese authorities who
obviously had no control; and the image (never entirely true) of the Sherpas
as a happy, smiling group, loyal to their sahibs and memsahibs and glad to
serve them faithfully.
	Steck and Griffith subsequently left the area. Moro, who in addition to
being a great climber is a highly skilled helicopter pilot, did not. He later flew
a mission bringing down an incapacitated Nepali/Canadian climber from
7,800 m, by far the highest helicopter rescue on Everest so far.
Violence is endemic in Nepal, and the Maoist insurgency in the backcountry formerly did affect mountaineers. The death toll to the insurgents
and to the Nepalese military and police who hunted them is estimated in
the tens of thousands. But all sides recognized the economic importance of
mountain climbing and tourism, and foreigners were largely exempt from
damage beyond a little genial “tax”—the sequestration of cameras, watches,
and other valuables. There is no evidence that last year’s incident has anything
to do with the still partially unresolved Maoist problem.
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The basic issue is about money—more specifically, income distribution.
All parties involved in the incident depend on mountain climbing and
mountain tourism, even the wealthy western climbers, whose endorsement
and other income must be maintained by regular “new” exploits for which the
Nepalese mountains and particularly Everest are important venues.
(Many do not realize the degree to which Everest dominates
mountaineering endeavors and expenditure in Nepal, particularly in the
all-important pre-monsoon season. For example, in the 2012 pre-monsoon
season, 209 expeditions to 18 permitted mountains in Nepal had 803 members
above base camp, but of these, the 89 expeditions to Everest had 482 members
above base camp. The 120 expeditions to permitted mountains other than
Everest accounted for only 321 members above base camp. If “members above
base camp” is taken as a measure of expenditure, 60 percent of it was on
Everest. Fees and prices are higher on that mountain and climbers typically
spend more time at and above Base Camp there, so the actual economic
dominance of Everest in the pre-monsoon season is even larger.)
South side route preparation has become more difficult and, in the opinion
of the working Sherpas, far more dangerous because of recent warmer premonsoon weather causing more rockfall and icefall on the route. Those hired
for the demanding and dangerous work understand that only a small portion
of the large sums brought in by the extensive commercial exploitation of
Everest “trickles down” to them.
Following the incident, the Nepal Mountaineering Association worked
out an agreement, which was immediately dubbed “the Treaty of Everest
2013,” in which some 28 signatories “realized their errors and apologized to
each other. . . . Both parties agreed to help each other in the future to make
successful each other’s goals.” All very well, and not surprising, as all probably
realized that bad publicity affects their livelihoods. However, it is not likely
that labor actions, threats, or even violence will be ended without betterment
in the individual economic status of the Sherpas. As western guide Adrian
Ballinger pointed out, the “Sherpa earns most or all of their family’s annual
income in these two months on the mountain.” By “two months,” he means
the pre-monsoon season on Everest.
The Murderous Assault at Nanga Parbat. The Nanga Parbat assault was
a far more serious affair. As with the Everest incident, accounts have varied,
but there is no obscuring the deadly nature of the event. It was the bloodiest
attack on a group of (mostly) foreign climbers in the history of Pakistan, and
so far as I recall, any other mountain country during the modern period.
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Eleven climbers, entirely inoffensive, chosen essentially by the accident
of their location at Nanga Parbat Base Camp, were murdered ganglandexecution style by about sixteen assailants in what now appears to be properly
identified as a terrorist attack.
Late on June 22, 2013, the assailants, wearing military clothing, attacked a
lodge at Nanga Parbat Base Camp, quickly killing all the occupants they could
find. The victims were mostly engaged in the quest for the accumulation of
8,000-m peaks and were identified as follows: Yang Chung Feng (who had
climbed eleven 8,000ers) and Rao Jian-Feng (who had completed nine); two
Slovakians—Anton Dobes who had climbed only Cho Oyu and Peter Sperka
who had summited three 8,000ers; three climbers from the Ukraine—leader
Igor Svergun (with five 8,000ers), Badavi Kashayev, and Dmytro Koniayev;
Lithuanian Ernestas Marksaitis, said to have climbed Broad Peak; an
American, Hong-Lu Chen, who had previously climbed Everest; Sona Sherpa
of Nepal (who had climbed three 8,000ers); and Ali Hussain of Pakistan, first
identified as a guide, later as a cook.
As frequently occurs after terrorist attacks, at least two organizations
claimed responsibility almost immediately: an anti-Shiite group called
Jandallah and, more believably, the Pakistani Taliban, which claimed the
attack was in retaliation for the U.S. drone killing of a Taliban commander.
Of course, none of the victims was Shiite and the Chinese American could
have no relationship to drone strikes. The attack was embarrassing to the
unstable Pakistan government, which almost immediately suspended local
officials and set up a senior investigation committee. Thirty-seven local
villagers were arrested and released after questioning. A more deliberate
investigation working through local jirgas (quasi representative assemblies
of local dignitaries) claims to have identified all sixteen of the attackers—
basically, local men though some had been trained at a site near the distant
and unstable border with Afghanistan.
	Smaller attacks on trekkers and mountaineers are not infrequent in
Pakistan. The best known to Americans is the shotgun attack on Ned Gillette
and his wife, Susie Patterson, near Laila Pk in 1998. Gillette, a well-known
climber, skier, adventure traveler, and writer, was killed, and Patterson was
seriously wounded. In the same season, a party of trekkers in Swat was
attacked and killed. However, as noted earlier, the Nanga Parbat attack is
unique in its severity.
The ultimate effect on mountaineering in Pakistan and the bordering
countries is difficult to judge. It is not surprising that two German expedition
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organizers immediately canceled their proposed trips to Nanga Parbat.
Pakistan mountains further east toward the Baltoro region may be less
vulnerable to attacks using local people as the populations are less numerous
and interlopers easier to spot. The same cannot be said for the mountainous
areas along the Pakistan borders with Afghanistan and the other “stans,”
nor in Kashmir. But these areas are notoriously dangerous, and mountain
climbers have routinely taken the risks all the same.

Nepal Himalaya
Pre-monsoon 2012. The thesis that mountaineering activity in the Nepal
Himalaya reflects (with a lag of a year or so) the recovery from the worldwide
recession is roughly borne out by the comparison of spring 2012 with spring
2011. The number of expeditions rose from 176 to 209. In 2011, 98 expeditions
were successful, putting 704 climbers on summits; the next year, 129 successful
expeditions placed 718 climbers on top. The number of female successes rose
from 50 to 65. Deaths rates changed little: ten team members and one hired
died in 2011; in 2012, ten members and three hired died. Although the number
of expeditions increased in 2012, the number of mountains attempted was
only 18 in spring 2012 compared with the 24 mountains tried in 2011.
First ascents are becoming rare in Nepal. For the first time in recent memory,
none were recorded in the 2012 pre-monsoon season. This was partly because
of heavy snows in the early season. Goetz Weigand’s German–Romanian try
on Tsartse (6,343 m) did not even reach base camp. (He is the only leader to
try the mountain in the Mukut Himal opened in 2002. His previous attempt
with another German–Romanian team failed in an approach from adjacent
Tashi Kang in 2006.) The other first ascent attempt, on Panpoche 1 (6,620
m) in the Manaslu Himal near the Tibetan border opened in 2005, was only
the second try. Two climbers from a Norwegian team led by Ola Einang
were hit by an avalanche on April 19 at about 5,400 m. Bjorn Myrer-Lund
was seriously injured, and Pasang Sherpa was so shaken that he descended
and reported the death of Myrer-Lund. Other members and Sherpas climbed
up to the site and found Myrer-Lund very cold and in great pain with a
leg broken in two places and cracked ribs. He was eventually brought down
and then evacuated to a Kathmandu hospital by helicopter. Einang reported
nearly continuous snows and climbing through drifts sometimes waist deep.
The expedition was abandoned April 23.
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Deaths in the 2012 pre-monsoon season. At first sight, the number of
deaths reported, ten members and three hired, might seem an unfortunate
but understandable result of the increased mountaineering activity. Only
three deaths occurred on mountains other than Everest, and the ten deaths
there—the worst result since 2006 when eleven died—might be called a
random increase. Instead, as discussed here, the increase could be the marker
of an ominous change on that mountain.
First the non-Everest deaths. Tibor Horvath, 33, of the first Hungarian
expedition to Annapurna (8,091 m) descended from Camp 4 on May 5, made
a call from Camp 3 at 4 p.m., then is believed to have been swept away by
an avalanche in a gully between Camps 2 and 3. His body was never located
because of deep snow. Jafar Naseri of an Iranian expedition attempting
Manaslu (8,163 m) with Omid Amohammadi and Hossein Saleki reached
the summit via the NE Face at 6:30 p.m. on May 10. They found the summit
cold and windy with limited visibility and almost immediately started down,
unroped. By 9:30 p.m. they reached 7,900 m. Naseri “fell down the right
side of the ridge” and disappeared. The frightened Amohammadi and Saleki
bivouacked in place and descended to Camp 4 the next morning. Subsequent
searches found no trace of Naseri. On Lhotse (8,516 m), the low-budget fivemember Czech Lhotse Summit 2012 Expedition hired no Sherpas and used no
supplementary oxygen. On May 19, Radovan Mareck and 50-year-old Mila
Selacek started for the summit from the 7,800-m Camp 4 on the Normal
Route. Selacek was unwell and lagged well behind Mareck, who reached the
summit at 5:30 p.m. On his descent, he encountered Selacek only 50 m below
the summit. Selacek was feeling better and wished to top out, so Mareck gave
him some water and a power bar, then continued to Camp 4. Selacek never
reached the camp. The weak Czech expedition could not mount a rescue
effort, but on May 22, other climbers reported they had seen Selacek’s body.
The cause of death was recorded as exposure and frostbite.
Unprecedented warmth complicated the early-season route preparation
phase on Everest (8,850 m), and many worried about the resulting dangers
to the preparation crews on the S Col route. In fact, none of the early
deaths seemed to bear any relation to the warm weather: Kasang Namgyal
Sherpa working for an Iranian expedition died at Base Camp—his death was
categorized as illness/non–acute mountain sickness (AMS); Ramesh Gulave
of an Indian expedition suffered a stroke while descending from 5,600 m on
April 20 and, after a second stroke, was transferred to a hospital where he died
a week later; Namgyal Tshering Sherpa, who was working on the route, failed
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Climbers have crowded themselves onto the slopes of Mount Everest for some years now,
creating bottlenecks and occasional flaming tempers on the established routes. Above, a
mini tent city fills Base Camp on the south side of the mountain in 2006. MICHAEL KODAS

to clip into a safety rope while crossing a crevasse and fell to his death on
April 21; and Dawa Tenzing Sherpa, 41, also working on the route, collapsed
descending from Camp 2 on May 1 and was evacuated to Kathmandu, where
he suffered another stroke and died.
The six subsequent deaths on Everest occurred on just two days, May 19
and 20. The 19th was the busiest day on the mountain, as measured by total
ascents—238. These concentrations of effort high on the mountain result
from the effective system devised by the commercial operators to get their
clients to the top. (A similar concentration of climbers occurred on May 25
and May 26, with 140 and 103 ascents, though fortunately with no deaths.)
In the pre-monsoon season, the majority of those who reach the summit are
clients or employees of the commercial operators. The system comprises route
preparation and fixed ropes, tent camps on the route, a high ratio of guides and
Sherpas to clients, generous use of supplementary oxygen, and—critically—
accurate prediction of a favorable “weather window” for the period when the
clients reach within striking distance of the top for their summit “day.” Even
climbers with no or minimal formal engagement with commercial operators
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piggyback on the system, depending on the prepared route and camps for
physical safety and on knowledge of the generally accurate predictions for the
window of good weather.
The favorable aspects are obvious. Everest is easier and apparently safer
to ascend than it used to be. But as the crowds near the top grow larger, the
prepared routes are basically one-track railways to the summit. At difficult
points, less adept and less fit climbers fumble and delay, and tightly packed
lines hundreds of meters long quickly form below them. The earliest and
fastest climbers, trying to descend from the summit against the upward flow,
cannot pass the pinch point, and waiting lines form both above and below.
In these lines, climbers must stand for hours, stamping their feet against the
rising chill in their boots and noting the decrease in or exhaustion of their
supplementary oxygen supplies.
The consequences can surpass mere cold feet and worry. Canadian Shriya
Shah Klorfine, 33, head of a Kathmandu trekking agency, led her own fiveperson expedition to the mountain and left Camp 4 on the S Col for the
summit at 7 p.m. on the evening of May 18 with two Sherpas. Climbing
slowly and greatly delayed by the long lines on the route, she did not reach
the summit until 2:30 p.m. on May 19—having already been en route for 20½
hours. On the descent, she became exhausted at the S Summit. Her Sherpas
short-roped her down to a little below the Balcony at 8,450 m, where she died
at 10:45 p.m.
	Song Won-bin, 44, of a Korean expedition left Camp 4 for the summit at
8 p.m. on May 18. His group of two members and three Sherpas topped out at
7:05 p.m. May 19. They spent less than an hour on the summit before beginning their descent. Song was stuck at the Hillary Step for four hours until
other Sherpas rescued him. He became partially snow-blind and his Sherpas
brought him down to the Balcony where he died. The death is recorded as
AMS.
The two remaining Everest deaths in the season occurred on May 20 on
the N Col/NE Ridge Route where crowding was less. (Twenty-five climbers
topped out from that side.) Juan Jose Polo Carbayo, 43, of the Canary Islands,
reached the summit with Sherpa Nima Dorje. Once there, Polo Carbayo
became euphoric and irrational, removed his oxygen mask and gloves and
refused to descend despite repeated pleas from Nima, who eventually started
down alone. Polo Carbayo followed later, but collapsed and died at 8,300 m.
The death cause is given as exhaustion. Ralf Arnold, 41, of Germany, climbing
alone without supplementary oxygen, is said to have reached the summit
winter/spring 2014 129

Appalachia_WS2014_FINAL pages_11.6.indd 129

11/6/13 7:12 AM

from the north on May 20. He died that day in a fall at 8,700 m. Arnold
made a similar solo, no-oxygen ascent of Cho Oyu in 2010.
The deaths of Klorfine and Won-bin were caused at least partly by the
excessive delays caused by overcrowding. It is possible that delays on the northside route may have contributed to the irrational behavior that caused the
death of Polo Carbayo. These unfortunate results occurred even though the
weather remained benign—the weather window predictions were accurate.
	Now consider the 1996 spring season on Everest, usually thought of as
the most tragic season and memorialized in Jon Krakauer’s blockbuster best
seller Into Thin Air (Villard Books, 1997), an overwrought made-for-TV
movie, and a host of other publications. Mountaineering activity on Everest
was much more limited then–total ascents in spring 1996 were 87 compared
with 551 in spring 2012. Nevertheless, significant parallels exist between the
events of May 10 and 11, 1996, and those of May 19 and 20, 2012. In 1996,
the commercial operator system for getting clients to the top did not work
smoothly. So, although only 32 climbers reached the summit on May 10 and
11, they waited for significant periods at critical points and many of the 32 were
still near the top late on May 10. As darkness descended, the favorable weather
window abruptly closed and was replaced by cold, snow, minimal visibility,
and a high, screaming wind—a disastrous failure of meteorological prediction
that has not occurred since. Before the weather cleared, eight members and
guides, including the two most experienced commercial expedition leaders,
died—seven of exposure and frostbite, one in a storm-caused fall. Several
other climbers suffered severe frostbite damage.
	Suppose that, instead of 30 or so climbers high on Everest when the
weather suddenly changes, 238 wait there in long lines above and below the
pinch points. As the wind and snow increase and visibility drops, it becomes
unsafe to leave the fixed ropes even for a minute. Satellite phones and other
communication and location devices become unusable in the extreme wind
and cold, so no one can even try to coordinate an unwinding of the jams and
a descent to the tent camps far below. An unprecedented Himalayan mountaineering catastrophe becomes probable.

China and Tibet
Mountaineering activity in this area, still the world’s largest reservoir
of unclimbed high mountains and new routes, was severely limited for
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foreigners in 2012, as has been true for several years. The Chinese authorities,
responding to continuing unrest in areas of significant ethnic Tibetan
population as symbolized by the self-immolation of Tibetan monks and their
sympathizers, clamped down on anyone who might report this unrest. Both
the Chinese authorities and the supporters of the elderly Dalai Lama, exiled
in India, condemn these fiery suicides as “un-Buddhist.” But as the time for
the political/religious choice of a new reincarnate becomes imminent, the
unrest grows. Equally important to the ethnic Tibetans is their loss of status
and identity as Han Chinese tourists and settlers flood into the region in
apparently unlimited numbers.
Travel by foreigners and contact with Tibetans is forbidden or actively
discouraged by local Chinese officials and by the Public Security Bureau (PSB)
using propaganda and direct threats. Other factors also contribute to travel
difficulties. Paradoxically, the physical improvements fostered by China’s
western development drive and the resulting increase in local incomes have
decreased access in some remote areas. Traditional foot and bridal trails are
abandoned and overgrown, and the Tibetans and other local people become
less willing to transport, serve, and shelter foreign travelers.
A more subtle but still important effect on exploratory mountaineering
is the technical development of satellite-based mapping technologies—
Google Earth and all its congeners. The process that its principal exponent
in the region, Tomatsu (Tom) Nakamura, calls “unveiling”—the finding,
locating geographically, picturing, and popularizing of previously unknown
or obscure mountains—has lost much of its romantic appeal. Sitting before
a computer, one now can generate detailed and accurate satellite-based maps
of whole ranges of once-remote mountains. Sorting out the mountains,
determining altitudes, and assigning identifying names (or coded numbers) is
a scholarly process more akin to bookkeeping than to exploration.
	In presently restricted eastern Tibet, Nakamura estimates that about
260 mountains higher than 6,000 m remain unclimbed. In the more politically accessible, though still largely Tibetan, West Sichuan highlands, there
are only ten or so virgin 6,000ers. With forced reduction in possible high
first ascents, mountaineers are showing more interest in rock climbs in the
Siguniang area and the Genyen massif north of the Litang plateau, and in
new routes and first ascents of lesser peaks in the region around Minya Konka
(Gongga Shan).
	Nakamura himself led a distinctly mature team from his Hengduan
Mountains Club (Nakamura, Tsuyoshi Nagai, and Tadao Shintani) to the
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West Sichuan highlands and Yunnan from late September to late October
2012. The boasted Nakamura “blue sky weather” failed to manifest itself.
In two weeks, there were only one and a half days of good photography.
Foreign travel restrictions were apparent. They met only two westerners and
no other Japanese. Nakamura credits such travel success as they had to the
efforts of his guide Zhang Jiyue.
The Exploits of Janne Corax in Tibet. Swede Janne Corax has a novel
approach to exploratory mountaineering that he outlines in a Japanese Alpine
News article (vol. 14, pages 1–10). He travels great distances without external
support by what he calls “fair means”—by mountain bicycle or on foot—
and asserts that in remote areas of Tibet, this is the most effective technique.
Of course, effective or not, great physical effort and danger is the almost-daily
lot of all participants, and his companions (often identified by first names or
initials only to protect their anonymity) frequently change.
	In 2003, Corax and Nadine Saulnier, a Canadian then resident in Sweden,
crossed the Chang Tang Plateau north to south in a 46-day unsupported
epic, which nearly cost them their lives. Their loaded bicycles weighed about
85 kilos each, and in most terrain had to be pushed rather than ridden. The
trip was a success—they had survived, but they failed to climb the virgin
Kangzhangri (6,305 m), also known as King Oscar’s Mountain. (The Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, who Corax takes as an exemplar, saw and sketched
the mountain from the north in early September 1896 and named it for King
Oscar II of Sweden.) When Corax and Saulnier reached civilization, they were
arrested and questioned by the Chinese PSB but were eventually released with
a warning and a small fine because the PSB could not believe that they had
actually crossed the Chang Tang alone and unsupported.
	In 2007, Corax and Saulnier learned that another expedition planned to
try for the first ascent of King Oscar’s Mountain that fall, so they decided
to make their attempt in the summer monsoon season. They started from
Huatugou with 50 days of locally procured food and fuel. The monsoon
weather on the Chang Tang Plateau was abysmal with thunderstorms and
blizzards—at one point they did not see the sun for nine days. The terrain
got so muddy that they left the bicycles and backpacked 85 km to the foot of
the mountain. Twenty-seven days and 600 km from the start, they reached
the mountain and, in a rare clear day, easily made the summit for the first
ascent. They took another two weeks to return to civilization. Alone or with
new companions, Corax then climbed eight more mountains. Of these, five
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were apparent first ascents, most notably three summits in the Toze Kangri
massif—all over 6,000 m by global positioning system.
	In 2008, Corax met Saulnier and a new companion, M.A., at Golmud
in Qinghai in early summer. The three set off on their bicycles for another
Chang Tang crossing with provisions for 60 days. The weather was a distinct
improvement over 2007 with few snowstorms. Encountering no one for 36
days, they reached Kukushili (6,388 m). The climb to the summit was difficult
in one of the few bad-weather days, and they had to find the top using GPS.
After the descent, they headed roughly south to reach an attractive lake called
Burog Co. From the lake, they made the easy climb of Purog Kangri (6,436
m), an apparent first ascent. On day 53, they reached Gomo Co (lake) where
they encountered nomads, who supplemented their nearly exhausted rations
with tea and rice. The whole 1,100 km traverse took 55 days.
	In 2010, this time with Lars B., Corax traveled by bicycle from
Huatugou and climbed Aleke Tag (6,080 m), the first ascent of an “ultra.”
(An “ultra” is a peak having a prominence of 1,500 meters or more.
Topographical prominence is an obscure discipline. Probably the most
intuitive definition of prominence in this sense is this: “Prominence of a
summit is the elevation difference between the summit and the lowest contour
line that encircles it but encircles no higher summit.”) They then made four
more first ascents, one, Ayalik (6,167 m) also an ultra. In 2012, Corax with
M. started from Kashgar for unclimbed Ak Tag (6,758 m), the highest peak
between the Ulugh Muztagh and Qong Muztagh—also an ultra. About 30
km short of the peak, M. bailed out. Corax backpacked to the peak, found a
relatively easy route, and made the solo first ascent.
From 2007 through 2012, Corax climbed nineteen peaks; sixteen of these
were first ascents to his “best knowledge.” Thirteen of these first ascents were
on 6,000ers and three were on ultras.
A remarkable score by any standard. Corax and his companions operate
independently of the Chinese official control system—they try to fly under
the radar. Their whole plan depends on evasion of official record keeping.
Corax mentions formal difficulty only once, arrest by the dreaded PSB after
the 2003 Chang Tang crossing. But there must have been encounters with
the curious or with potential informers at every approach to even the most
primitive vestiges of civilization and control. How were these evaded or
otherwise handled? Although Corax sometimes describes the grubby details
of survival in the cold, snowy, high-altitude environment, other details are
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either ignored or obscured. For example, how were the batteries in the GPS
devices and digital (I suppose) cameras kept charged for the months of use
in a cold and sometimes wet and snowy environment? For the first ascents,
there are few or no witnesses except the sometimes-anonymous climbers
themselves. Our only choice is to look at the photos, read the accounts, and
decide—is this to be believed or not?
Corax takes Sven Hedin as a model, and anyone who has toiled through
the interminable pages of Hedin’s voluminous books can vouch for the accumulation of supporting data. Nevertheless, our evidence for the truth of
many of Hedin’s assertions is no more than, “That is what Hedin said.” Perhaps Corax should be offered the same tolerance.
Acknowledgments. These notes are based in part on accounts in The American
Alpine Journal and The Himalayan Journal, their electronic supplements, and
Japanese Alpine News. The use of the valuable reference sources The Himalayan
Database and 8000ers.com is also gratefully acknowledged.
—Jeffery Parrette
Alpina Editor
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